The price is elastic, an analysis of the purchaser's market of theatre shows

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The Netherlands has a tradition in which theatres traditionally present shows and concerts and rarely produce the shows and concerts; they are "receptive theatres". Venues and companies are separate organisations, each with its own artistic goals and financial management. In The Netherlands, producing companies travel throughout the country taking their performances to different places. Only a few companies do not travel and have their own stage or hall, or a stage owned by someone else in which they perform all or most of their performances. This is in contrast with many countries in which companies and stages are part of the same organisation. Because of this division the Netherlands has a market of purchasing shows and concerts.

A number of venues are asking whether their financial conditions for presenting subsidised and unsubsidised shows are worse or better than the conditions that colleague halls have. Another set of questions concern just the performances of subsidised companies. Subsidised performances are, for the most part, made up of grants. Do venues take less financial risk when they present subsidised performances because the performance costs are covered by a grant? And what is the correlation between potential earnings and the risk that halls take? In short the research questions are the following:

1. How does the price making process look when purchasing shows?

2. Are there differences between the purchase of unsubsidised and subsidised shows?

This research will answer these questions. Because the research is commissioned by halls, the text is written from the perspective of the halls.

Price

Adam Smith, the founder of economic science, makes a distinction between the *natural* and the *market* price. The *natural* price is the price based on costs. Performances have initial costs for rehearsals, decor, costumes, lighting design, marketing et cetera. After the première they have variable costs for salaries, transport, royalties and marketing. A show with a short tour has higher average costs than the same show with a longer tour. Shows with significant decor, lights, and actors on stage are more expensive than smaller shows. The *market* price is the price the market is willing to pay for a show. The market price depends on elements such as the size of the audience and the willingness of the audience to pay a certain admission charge. These aspects in turn depend largely on the perceived quality of the work and substitutes. While artists, performances and concerts are generally unique, if the price producers demand is too high they may be replaced by different, less expensive shows and concerts. Which price is applicable in the theatre world? Producers and their agents will always try to charge the higher of the natural and the market price.

While there have been several studies on the admission charges of theatre shows, only Van der Kar[1] (1976) has examined the pricing of shows. Results suggest the following factors for the procurement of subsidised drama:

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[1] Van der Kar (1976): 13.

the target group of a show (a show for children is cheaper than one for adults); the distance between the venue and the theatre company; competing performances in the vicinity of the venue; the image of the stage; the capacity of the stage; the policy of the local government regarding arts subsidies; and whether the venue is run under communal or private management. According to Van der Kar the procurement price of theatre shows other than drama will not differ much from drama.[2]

On the supply side there are subsidised and commercial producers, only a few of which have a strong dominance in the market. Some subsidised companies have such an exclusive position that they can choose from the venues in which they want to perform. Other companies face great difficulty finding a sufficient number of performing possibilities to meet the terms of their funders and cover their costs.

Commercial producers mostly tend to be small companies that create performances that are less expensive. If they do not have strong advance sales for a production before the theatre season has started, they may cancel the production; a decision that has negative consequences on the freelance performers and other workers contracted for the show, who may not be able to find other work in the current season.

Large commercial producers create a greater number of productions and usually have strong marketing departments and good contacts with the media. This enables them to push prices upwards, resembling monopolistic competition.

On the demand side (the halls and the festivals) there is a limited number of buyers. There are also distinctions between the halls in terms of size and specialisation (entertainment theatres, theatres with mixed programming, or halls with only subsidised performances).

The prices of performances and concerts are determined by the aforementioned factors, but the actual price that the venues pay is not determined exogenously and varies from show to show and from stage to stage. In the market of the performing arts we find transparency regarding show, place, date, role division, admission charges, number of shows and purchasers, largely due to the fact that performances are publicly advertised. There is however a lack of disclosure about the financial conditions; neither producing companies nor venues exchange this sort of information. Producers think they benefit from the lack of transparency; for venues however the transparency issues resemble a prisoner's dilemma.[3] Does an information asymmetry aid in sustaining their presumed favourable conditions or are they better off with making the conditions known in the interest of the collective whereby the complete level of conditions will change in favour of the venues?

Purchase

The procurement strategy of venues depends upon their function and positioning. There are three primary types of halls:

1. Art oriented halls. These are halls which primarily serve the arts. The content of the show is important and they are willing to compromise financially in order to put a show on the stage.

2. Common good oriented halls. These take the function of the stage, the cultural mission, into account, but they also consider the tastes and preferences of the audience. They usually present a mixed

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[2] He did not think about pop music with this, because pop stages received small grants through Social Affairs and not through the department of Arts. Pop music has taken part in the research incidentally since maybe 10 years.
[3] The problem of the prisoner's dilemma was first mentioned by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher. Albert W. Tucker invented the name prisoner's dilemma (Poundstone, W. (1992) Prisoner's Dilemma Doubleday, NY NY.).

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program of unsubsidised and subsidised performances. They can take a moderate viewpoint when negotiating a price.

3. Market oriented halls. These think that the theatre exists to provide entertainment and they tend to present popular shows that are likely to do well at the box office. They do not programme from an artistic vision, but from the needs of the box office. These venues can negotiate sharply because they put the expected box office revenues against the purchasing prices without feeling the inner necessity to present certain performances. They are thus more likely to pull out of a tour if a show becomes too expensive.

The market position of a venue is also determined by other factors, for example if a venue has a strict mission to present only theatre companies that are subsidised by the government, its negotiating position will not be very strong. A small theatre with a thinly populated and small area to serve is also not in a good position to negotiate when compared to a large theatre with more halls and a larger geographic area to serve.

Forms of conditions

What are the purchasing conditions for shows? In a few cases a fixed amount will be paid for a show, a so-called buying out price. In that case the halls are carrying the risk of the ticket sales and the company is ensured of its income. In the theatre world this type of contract is more common with subsidised shows in the genres of drama, dance, chamber music and opera. It is less common with unsubsidised performances than with subsidised shows because unsubsidised shows commonly have higher returns than subsidised, and producers will seek a share in any profits.[4]

A second form is the so-called sharing agreement, in which box office revenues are divided between venue and producer according to an agreed upon ratio split, sometimes with a certain base amount guaranteed. Sharing agreements generally vary the ratio of the split based on the final size of the box office revenues. For example, a 70/30 split or division means that the producer will get 70% and the venue 30% of the net box office revenues. (The producer share is generally the first number in the ratio.) Net box office revenues are calculated as gross sales minus taxes, minus possible sales expenses for the theatre, minus royalties.

The third variety is the hiring of a hall. The player rents the hall and carries the risk of ticket sales. This form is common in the world of pop music, but less common in the theatre and classical music world. This form is also seen in amateur performances and with performances aimed at the corporate world.

Guarantee

A sharing agreement will sometimes require a guarantee to be paid to the producer. A guarantee has two functions:

- to cover daily costs, which includes costs for transport, constructing and tearing down the stage setting, marketing costs during the tour and salaries including per diem for the actors, musicians, dancers and technicians and

- to secure pre-financing from a bank, which often requires some certainties, such as a contractually agreed upon guarantee, to be shown.

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[4] Berg, Hans Onno van den (2007).

The guarantee per show depends on the daily costs and the preparatory costs divided by the length of the tour.

The phenomenon guarantee and sharing agreement are not common in all countries. There are countries where venues provide only rental space for unsubsidised performances; the producer rents the hall and carries the risk of a show as an entrepreneur, taking both profits and losses. In contrast venues across the world presenting subsidised performances carry a risk because the producers cannot bring their work to the stage without the help of the halls. Either the costs are too high – for example with opera – or the audiences are too small – for example modern dance or experimental theatre – for a cost covering exploitation. In The Netherlands halls pay guarantees for unsubsidized performances because The Netherlands have many small venues where the maximum box office revenues is insufficient to cover the daily costs and because the system of continually travelling is very expensive for producers.

Research

For the research the data of 16 theatre productions were considered which were performed 108 times in 17 participating halls. Six of these were unsubsidised productions in the genres musical, popular music and drama, offered by three different producers; and ten were subsidised productions in the genres dance and drama, offered by ten subsidised companies.

We created a stratified sample, which included participants representing the diverse characterisations mentioned above as well as diverse regions of the country, and across a range of venue capacity, with a maximum seating capacity of 1400. Ten venues presented unsubsidised shows, nine presented subsidised shows, and two halls presented shows in both categories. The division between subsidised and unsubsidised has been made because many venues are specialised in only unsubsidised or subsidised performances. Pop venues and concert halls were not included in this study.

Analysis

Risk and potential returns play part for the procurement of shows. Promoters and buyers try to push the risk of disappointing ticket sales to each other as much as possible and try to retain the largest portion of the box office revenues for themselves. In buying out or rental agreements, it is clear which party carries the risk (the venue in the first instance and the producer in the second); however, with shared risk agreements, including those that include a guarantee, there must be negotiation about the division of the risk.

This study examines the aspects of risk and potential returns for venues. Risk is expressed as the percentage of total seating capacity of the hall that must be sold in order for box office revenues to exceed the guarantee or buying out price.

Risk and net proceeds

We have made risk and net proceeds visible by determining four quadrants, as seen in figure 1. In this figure we have put the risk of the hall expressed in the percentage of the hall-capacity that need to be sold to pay the guarantee or buying out price on the horizontal axis (the x-axis). On the y-axis the sharing of the hall is expressed, varying from 0 to 100%. The point (0,0) is the point on which the hall does not pay any guarantee or buying out price but also does not receive anything from the box office revenues. The point (100,100) is the point on which the hall pays a guarantee or buying out price equal to the receipts from a sold-out hall and on which it can completely keep the box office revenues.

The quadrant below right is the quadrant in which the company or promoter comes off the best. It has agreed with the hall upon a high guarantee and a sharing which is favourable. If ticket sales are disappointing the

company/promoter still receives a relatively high guarantee, if the show is a box office success, the company/promoter receives a big part of the box office revenues. A company/promoter will try to enter this quadrant. The term "altruist" is thought of from the buyer's point of view and is a euphemism for a "bad buy". For the company/promoter, however, it is an excellent result.

The hall comes off best in the quadrant above left, the net proceeds taker. Here the hall runs little risk and the proceeds from strong ticket sale are large. A promoter or company will try to stay out of this quadrant.

Now we have two quadrants left. Below left we find the halls which run little risk but they will also receive a small part of the box office revenues when the show is successful, the so-called risk avoiders. In the quadrant above right we find the venues which are willing to agree to high guarantee in exchange for a high sharing in the box office revenues. But here's a difference in behaviour related to subsidised and unsubsidised shows. With unsubsidised shows the presenter is a gambler, hoping for a full hall and consequently a big sharing return. With subsidised performances, the presenter is not a gambler but is as we call a 'contenter'. He chooses subsidised shows not for profit opportunities but for reasons concerning the artistic content of the show. He is willing to commit to it even if box office revenues will likely be low.

Figure 1 risk part and box office revenues for halls[5]

As previously mentioned, the behaviour of promoters is aimed at achieving the conditions in the altruist quadrant as often as possible, while venues are better off with the quadrant net proceeds taker. Figure 2 shows the measured values of unsubsidised shows, most of which are in the quadrant 'risk avoider', and a smaller number of which are in the quadrants altruist, gambler, and net proceeds taker.

In the quadrant risk avoider one primarily finds shows with low production costs, for instance, cabaret shows, which have little salary costs besides those for the artist, minimal production requirements and which tend to sell well. These conditions often result in promoters agreeing to a low guarantee.

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[5] In figure 1 the B out stands for buying out and the G for guarantee.

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Figure 2 sharing – risk hall

Within the figure the measured values seem to be divided in groups within the quadrants. We can distinguish three clusters:

Area 1: sharing without guarantee, with a split between 80/20 and 70/30 for producer and hall;

Area 2: sharing with guarantee, with a split between 80/20 and 75/25 for producer and hall;

Area 3: the buying out amounts with a breakeven point varying between 39% to 77% of seating capacity.

Furthermore there is an area 4 in the quadrant of net proceeds taker in which there are no measured values, which is remarkable. One would expect that in the complete spectrum of possibilities there are agreements. This is not the case. The reason is – presumably – that promoters do not agree with a division of for example 50/50 for promoter and hall. They are willing, in a number of cases, to sell a show on the basis of buying out. This is area 3. But buying out is the same as sharing 0/100 with a guarantee X for the promoter. Meaning that the promoter receives a fixed amount (buying out or guarantee X) and that the box office revenues go to the hall; i.e. sharing 0 for the promoter and 100 for the hall. For the promoter it is good to keep the difference between sharing – guarantee and buying out alive. For the hall it would be better to get rid of the notion of buying out and only talk of sharing with a guarantee. In that case we can work with a guarantee and sharing varying between 100/0 and 0/100.[6]

Let's analyse the quadrant altruist further. This quadrant contains 31% (13) of the observations (N=41) for unsubsidised shows. Noticeable is that a few performances and halls are represented too many times. Two venues together have seven shows in this quadrant. The concerned halls both have a bigger hall capacity than the average hall but still agree to conditions which are relatively unfavourable to them. Is this because the halls perform badly? Because they realise a low degree of occupation? A statistic analysis shows that some halls make bad purchases. There are no objective criteria's why they should carry more risk than others. When we look at the promoters and the number of times that they have made a deal about the conditions in the quadrant altruist, it seems that the shows of the biggest producer are most often found in this quadrant. The biggest venues know how to keep the risk the lowest with these performances. With other promoters there is a

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[6] Those who are strict in the doctrine point out that sharing 100/0 cannot be sharing. Obviously one cannot be divided by zero.

big dispersal over the different quadrants.[7] This symptom can be the result of market dominance, quality of a production or from a better sales machine for the selling of shows to halls. In this context we can report that when a unsubsidised producer or agent does not have a good sales machine, the place will go bankrupt. Sellers will be replaced. There is no advertisement known to us for a programmer in which demonstrable commercial experience was asked next to artistic knowledge. With unsubsidised producers the good salesman will come out on top, with the halls a programmer will seldom leave because of insufficient commercial qualities. Unless the programmer is also the director. The last one will often experience an involuntary end and not seldom because the exploitation of the hall stays behind the budget.[8]

Do big halls purchase unsubsidised shows for better financial conditions?

From the analysis it appears that bigger halls have better conditions than small ones. That's not a surprise. What is a surprise is that with unsubsidised shows there is a negative correlation between the price of the ticket and the maximum percentage that a hall can keep from the box office revenues. This means that the hall receives a relatively low percentage of the box office revenues from the performances with the most expensive tickets. This is remarkable and maybe this is the result of the market dominance of the promoters in this segment of the market.

Subsidised shows

Figure 3 subsidised performances

The financial conditions of subsidised shows are in four areas (figure 3):

Area 1: shows whereby a company rents the stage from the hall

Area 2: sharing without guarantee

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[7] 'Joseph and the amazing technicolor dreamcoat' and 'Tineke Schouten' – both shows from Joop van de Ende Theaterproducties – can most often be found in the quadrant of altruist.
[8] VSCD (2003) *Een ongewild einde*, VSCD, Amsterdam.

Area 3: sharing varying from 60% to 80% for the promoter and the risk for the hall to almost 100%

Area 4: shows on the basis of buying out.

It's noticeable that with a few shows the buying out amount is so high that the hall even must add to the purchase with a 100% occupation. This is the case in 12,5% of the observations.

Guarantee and sharing with subsidised performances

The correlations between all data of the research are shown in supplement II in a correlation matrix. This matrix shows that with subsidised performances the height of the guarantee amount is *not* related to the hall capacity. It is neither related to the height of the admission charge. The guarantee does vary with the average degree of occupation which the hall has realised in all shows presented and which are studied in the research (R=0,648, N=67). We take this number as an extent to which the hall does or does not do good business. The question is which causal relationship there is. Are promoters willing to agree to lower guarantees with successful halls or are successful halls successful because the management knows about good marketing and agrees to good conditions? We do not know the answer.

With subsidised performances there is a strong positive correlation between the revenue sharing of a hall and the guarantee which it pays (R=0,67, N=67). The higher the guarantee, the bigger the sharing of the theatre. There is a slight negative correlation between the sharing and the realised occupation of a hall (R=-0,287, N=67). Halls have a higher sharing with shows that have less audience. This points to the fact that companies sell performances for which they expect no big audience on the basis of buying out. As if the promoters know that there will not be a big audience for their shows and that it is artistically not that outstanding. It is worth more to them that the halls are willing to present the performances. Furthermore we notice a difference between halls themselves. The one hall structurally chooses risk avoiding conditions, while the other takes more risk. Some halls employ renting amounts for the companies in their own city.

Guarantee and sharing with unsubsidised performances

The guarantee with unsubsidised performances depends on the price of the admission ticket (R=0,799, N=41) and the maximum box office revenues generated (R=0,567, N=41). There are no fixed amounts. Against all expectations the guarantee is not related to the realised average occupation degree. This is remarkable because upon inquiry, three promoters stated that they thought that the proved occupation degree plays a big part in the price negotiations with halls.[9]

There is no relation between guarantee and the sharing that a hall receives (R=-0,039, N=41). Contrary to subsidised shows it seems that the negotiations about guarantee and sharing of unsubsidised performances are independent. Sharing and the average occupations of shows are not strongly related either (R=0,214, N=41). There is a small negative correlation between the occupation degree of one show and the sharing for that show (R=-0,201, N=41). For performances with less audience the promoters give the halls with unsubsidised performances a better sharing. They know because of less audience they don't give away their profit and in most cases they still receive their guarantee.

With unsubsidised performances sharing is independent of admission charge, guarantee, realised and average occupation degree. It is not apparent if the guarantee amount covers the prime cost of the producer or that the last one needs additional earnings from sharing on top of the guarantee. It may be possible that the revenues

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[9] Information from Jacques Senf en Partners, Ruud de Graaf en Supierz Artist Management.

from sharing compensate a disappointing guarantee when a producer sells less shows of a production than he counted on. The research shows that shows are sold to similar halls with strongly variable conditions.

Conclusions and recommendations

In general

1. Related to the procurement of shows there are almost no fixed financial conditions. The price is elastic. The number of measured values of the one presenter in a certain quadrant does appear more often than another.

2. Halls have a fixed pattern for the procurement of shows. They are risk avoiding or not and/or have many or little shows on the basis of renting the hall. This pattern is separate from the reached number of audiences. Halls that present many shows on the basis of rent are financially better off than halls that only work with buying out and sharing/guarantee.

3. The theatre world has little transparency about the purchasing conditions of shows. Transparency in a market can boost the optimal forming of the price. This is an advantage for the collective but not necessarily for the individual. A unique hall can have favourable conditions and keeps its mouth shut to continue his relative advantage. For the collective of halls it is better if there is transparency about the financial conditions.

4. On the side of the presenters there are fewer parties than on the side of the purchasers. Purchasers can make their purchasing power stronger by working together at the purchase. For example by insisting on quantum discount when they purchase together.

5. To let the market function well it is recommendable as a countervailing power against sellers of especially unsubsidised shows, to judge programmers on commercial skills and performances.

6. The Dutch government wants companies to earn a bigger part of their income themselves.[10] Subsidised touring companies have two important sources of income: the grants and the selling of performances. Companies with own halls or with a fixed playing area have other sources of income like sponsors, catering income and "friends of" clubs. For a company that travels through the country with one night performances this is not a topic of discussion. Halls are afraid the companies will recharge the higher income demand to the halls. Because of this the data of this research will be compared in 2013 with data from that year. We will see then what the sharpened income demand for the companies has meant for the halls.

Unsubsidised shows

7. With unsubsidised shows we have seen no correlation between guarantee and sharing. Both variables seem to be negotiated separately.

8. The guarantee amount with unsubsidised performances depends on the price of the admission tickets and the maximum generated box office revenues. Against all expectations it has no relation to the realised average occupation rate.

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[10] From 2013 in the Netherlands there is a minimum norm of 17,5% own income for culture institutions with government grants. In the period 2013-2016 the institutions want to realise an own income growing of 4% next to that.

9. Many conditions happen in the area between sharing 85/15 and 70/30. Sharing 0/100 also happens a lot (buying out). In this case always with a guarantee (buying out amount). It's remarkable that there are no agreements made between 70/30 and 0/100. We suspect this is the result of the use of the term buying out – which in fact is a guarantee with sharing 0/100 – versus the usual sharings, and the fact that promoters have no use for agreements in the quadrant net proceeds taker. The acceptance of the sharings between 70/30 and 0/100 would probably enlarge when we do not use the term buying out any more but instead only use the term sharing with guarantee.

10. Halls that are successful with visitors' numbers are also successful with their purchasing conditions. With the data of this research it cannot be proven if successful halls do better in more parts of theatre management or that they are rewarded with more favourable conditions by the promoters because of higher visitor numbers.

Subsidised shows

11. With subsidised shows we perceive a significantly positive correlation between guarantee and sharing: the higher the guarantee, the higher the sharing of the theatre.

12. We notice a significantly negative correlation between the agreed upon sharing percentage of a hall and the realised occupation. With shows that have less audience the hall receives a higher sharing. Because the box office revenues in those cases are often insufficient to pay the guarantee, a high sharing is sooner a cosmetic than a financially attractive aspect.

13. With subsidised performances there is a bigger variation in forms of contract than with unsubsidised performances. A sharing with guarantee goes in 63% of the cases with unsubsidised performances.

To contemplate

In this research the halls carry the risk of the ticket sale of the first 261 seats of subsidised performances. They receive 11% of the box office revenues on average. With unsubsidised shows the halls carry the risk of the first 341 seats and receive 23% of the box office revenues on average. Producers of unsubsidised performances will ask themselves why such a big part of the box office revenues goes to the companies with subsidised performances while the costs of those companies are subsidised in average for circa 80%. They will also ask themselves why halls in that situation are willing to carry a risk the size of 261 seats. This brings us to the next point. Many times it is remarked that halls are inclined to program more subsidised and fewer unsubsidised performances. If it is indeed the goal to present more subsidised performances in Dutch halls, then the key to a change in this behaviour lies with the risk that the halls carry. This risk is rather high with unsubsidised shows.

It is not a conclusion from this research but the results does make one think that a reduction of the risk may lead to bigger willingness of the halls to program more subsidised performances. With shows for which enlargement of the tour leads to better economic exploitation, the risk of a lower guarantee for a company may be compensated by the profits of bigger tours.

The contents also have to be considered as a relatively big risk for halls with subsidised performances It makes the reaching of the audience the one-sided responsibility of the halls. The question is if this was meant by the current arts policy. A further discussion about the relationship between government, companies and halls, related to the financial conditions and risks of shows, seems in its place.

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Appendix I

Participating in the research of unsubsidised shows were 10 halls:

- De Meervaart, Amsterdam
- Schouwburg Almere, Almere
- Orpheus, Apeldoorn
- Chassé Theater, Breda
- Stadsschouwburg en Muziekcentrum, Enschede
- Parkstad Limburg Theaters, Heerlen
- Het Park, Hoorn
- Stadsschouwburg De Harmonie, Leeuwarden
- Theaters Tilburg, Tilburg
- Zaantheater, Zaanstad

The researched shows are shows in the season 2008/2009 which have been produced without a grant. Within this group shows were chosen from the genres popular music, cabaret, unsubsidised drama and musical. While choosing the distribution between several presenters was also taken into account. Presenters are the biggest presenters from The Netherlands, namely Joop van den Ende Theaterproducties, represented by agency Senf and partners, Ruud de Graaf and Mojo Theater. We have chosen for these presenters to have the biggest chance that the shows are presented by more than one participating hall. The studied shows are:

- Concert Mariska van Kolck, popular music
- Jörgen Raymann, cabaret
- Tineke Schouten Posi-Tien, show
- Joseph and the amazing Technicolor dreamcoat, musical
- Op hoop van zegen, musical
- Niet voor de poes, drama

Because not every show is programmed by each hall, the research has 42 observations.

Participating in the research of subsidised shows were nine halls:

- Stadsschouwburg Amsterdam
- Chassé Theater, Breda
- Theaters Tilburg, Tilburg
- Rotterdamse Schouwburg, Rotterdam
- Koninklijke Schouwburg, Den Haag
- Theater aan 't Vrijthof, Maastricht
- Theater de Spiegel, Zwolle
- Stadsschouwburg Groningen, Groningen
- Stadsschouwburg Utrecht, Utrecht

The studied shows are shows from the season 2008/2009 which have been produced with a grant. Within this group shows from the genres dance and drama were chosen. Here we also took into account the distribution between the several presenters. Presenters are the big companies in the Netherlands.

Choices wered made, just as with the unsubsidised shows, to have the biggest chance that shows are presented by more than one participating hall. The studied shows are from the theatre companies RO-theater (RO) Rotterdam, Het Nationaal Toneel (HNT) Den Haag, Orkater Amsterdam, Theatercompagnie Amsterdam, Het Zuidelijk Toneel (HZT) Eindhoven, Het toneel Speelt (HTS) Amsterdam and the dancing companies Scapino Rotterdam, Emio Greco Amsterdam and het Nederlands Danstheater II Den Haag. The studied shows are:

- HZT, Grote verkiezingsshow, drama
- NNT, De vrouw met de baard, drama
- Theatercompagnie, De koopman van Venetië, drama
- HNT, Medea, drama
- HTS, Geschiedenis van de familie Avenier, drama
- Orkater, Kamp Holland, drama
- RO, Woyzeck, drama
- Emio Greco, Purgatoria, dance
- NDT II, Déja vu, dance
- Scapino, Wonderworld, dance

Because not every show is programmed by each hall, the research has 67 observations.

Supplement I I

Correlation matrix; shows with a grant

		chairs	guarantee	sharing hall	Highest price	Maximum box office revenues	Chairs taken for guarantee	% Chairs taken for guarantee	Maximum promoter	Maximum hall	Maximum proc hall	Per chair	occupation	Occupation-proc	Average occupation	proc_occupation	Grant = yes"(FILTER)	finverpl
chairs	Pearson Correlation	1	0,034	-,309(*)	0,008	,826(**)	0,065	-,664(**)	,651(**)	,507(**)	,585(**)	,585(**)	,604(**)	-0,216	,412(**)	-0,211	.(a)	,475(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0,782	0,011	0,952	0,000	0,601	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,079	0,001	0,086	.	0,000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
guarantee	Pearson Correlation	0,034	1	,670(**)	0,037	0,075	,957(**)	,545(**)	-0,069	,253(*)	0,133	0,136	-0,057	-0,119	-,287(*)	-,342(**)	.(a)	,726(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,782		0,000	0,768	0,545	0,000	0,000	0,579	0,039	0,282	0,272	0,648	0,337	0,019	0,005	.	0,000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
sharing_hall	Pearson Correlation	-,309(*)	,670(**)	1	0,091	-0,160	,601(**)	,640(**)	-,345(**)	,256(*)	-0,049	-0,048	-,361(**)	-0,152	-,275(*)	-0,192	.(a)	,280(*)

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,011	0,000		0,463	0,196	0,000	0,000	0,004	0,037	0,693	0,698	0,003	0,219	0,024	0,119	.		0,022
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67		67	67
Highest price	Pearson Correlation	0,008	0,037	0,091	1	,378(**)	-0,118	-0,013	,481(**)	-0,064	-0,182	-0,154	0,087	0,065	0,049	0,038	.(a)		,360(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,952	0,768	0,463		0,002	0,343	0,914	0,000	0,608	0,140	0,213	0,486	0,604	0,696	0,758	.		0,003
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67		67	67
Maximum box office revenues	Pearson Correlation	,826(**)	0,075	-0,160	,378(**)	1	-0,021	-,587(**)	,848(**)	,517(**)	,467(**)	,520(**)	,558(**)	-0,116	,282(*)	-,260(*)	.(a)		,643(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,545	0,196	0,002		0,866	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,349	0,021	0,034	.		0,000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67		67	67
Chairs occupied for guarantee	Pearson Correlation	0,065	,957(**)	,601(**)	-0,118	-0,021	1	,537(**)	-0,150	0,203	0,161	0,148	-0,096	-0,194	-,248(*)	-,326(**)	.(a)		,637(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,601	0,000	0,000	0,343	0,866		0,000	0,226	0,100	0,194	0,231	0,441	0,116	0,043	0,007	.		0,000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67		67	67

% Chairs occupied for guarantee	Pearson Correlation	-,664(**)	,545(**)	,640(**)	-0,013	-,587(**)	,537(**)	1	-,470(**)	-,349(**)	-,632(**)	-,645(**)	-,492(**)	0,068	-,308(*)	-0,011	.(a)		0,097
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,914	0,000	0,000		0,000	0,004	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,585	0,011	0,933	.		0,434
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67		67	67
Maximum promoter	Pearson Correlation	,651(**)	-0,069	-,345(**)	,481(**)	,848(**)	-0,150	-,470(**)	1	-0,015	0,051	0,124	,512(**)	0,009	,431(**)	-0,037	.(a)		,636(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,579	0,004	0,000	0,000	0,226	0,000		0,905	0,682	0,316	0,000	0,940	0,000	0,766	.		0,000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67		67	67
maximum_hall	Pearson Correlation	,507(**)	,253(*)	,256(*)	-0,064	,517(**)	0,203	-,349(**)	-0,015	1	,799(**)	,781(**)	0,226	-0,235	-0,163	-,431(**)	.(a)		0,186
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,039	0,037	0,608	0,000	0,100	0,004	0,905		0,000	0,000	0,066	0,056	0,186	0,000	.		0,132
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67		67	67
maximum_proc_hall	Pearson Correlation	,585(**)	0,133	-0,049	-0,182	,467(**)	0,161	-,632(**)	0,051	,799(**)	1	,982(**)	,308(*)	-,250(*)	-0,084	-,330(**)	.(a)		0,138
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,282	0,693	0,140	0,000	0,194	0,000	0,682	0,000		0,000	0,011	0,042	0,498	0,006	.		0,264

	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
per_chair	Pearson Correlation	,585(**)	0,136	-0,048	-0,154	,520(**)	0,148	-,645(**)	0,124	,781(**)	,982(**)	1	,322(**)	-0,223	-0,042	-,334(**)	.(a)	0,191
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,272	0,698	0,213	0,000	0,231	0,000	0,316	0,000	0,000		0,008	0,070	0,737	0,006	.	0,121
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
occupation	Pearson Correlation	,604(**)	-0,057	,361(**)	0,087	,558(**)	-0,096	-,492(**)	,512(**)	0,226	,308(*)	,322(**)	1	,624(**)	,384(**)	0,130	.(a)	,309(*)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,648	0,003	0,486	0,000	0,441	0,000	0,000	0,066	0,011	0,008		0,000	0,001	0,293	.	0,011
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
Occupation_proc	Pearson Correlation	-0,216	-0,119	-0,152	0,065	-0,116	-0,194	0,068	0,009	-0,235	-,250(*)	-0,223	,624(**)	1	0,118	,353(**)	.(a)	-0,086
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,079	0,337	0,219	0,604	0,349	0,116	0,585	0,940	0,056	0,042	0,070	0,000		0,342	0,003	.	0,490
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
Average_occupation	Pearson Correlation	,412(**)	-,287(*)	-,275(*)	0,049	,282(*)	-,248(*)	-,308(*)	,431(**)	-0,163	-0,084	-0,042	,384(**)	0,118	1	,340(**)	.(a)	0,075

	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001	0,019	0,024	0,696	0,021	0,043	0,011	0,000	0,186	0,498	0,737	0,001	0,342		0,005	.	0,546
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
proc_occupation	Pearson Correlation	-0,211	-,342(**)	-0,192	0,038	-,260(*)	-,326(**)	-0,011	-0,037	-,431(**)	-,330(**)	-,334(**)	0,130	,353(**)	,340(**)	1	.(a)	-,290(*)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,086	0,005	0,119	0,758	0,034	0,007	0,933	0,766	0,000	0,006	0,006	0,293	0,003	0,005		.	0,017
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
Grant = yes	Pearson Correlation	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		.
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
finverpl	Pearson Correlation	,475(**)	,726(**)	,280(*)	,360(**)	,643(**)	,637(**)	0,097	,636(**)	0,186	0,138	0,191	,309(*)	-0,086	0,075	-,290(*)	.(a)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000	0,022	0,003	0,000	0,000	0,434	0,000	0,132	0,264	0,121	0,011	0,490	0,546	0,017	.	
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

Correlation-matrix: shows without grant

		Chairs	guarantee	Sharing hall	Highest price	Maximum box office revenues	Chairs taken for guarantee	% Chairs taken for guarantee	maximum promoter	maximum hall	maximum proc_hall	per_chair	occupation	occupation_proc	Average occupation	proc_occupation	Gran = yes (FILTER)	finverpl
chairs	Pearson Correlation	1	-0,049	-0,147	0,187	,687(**)	-0,203	-,496(**)	,512(**)	,718(**)	0,093	0,229	,769(**)	,332(*)	,488(**)	0,237	.(a)	0,277
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0,759	0,358	0,242	0,000	0,204	0,001	0,001	0,000	0,562	0,150	0,000	0,034	0,001	0,136	.	0,079
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
guarantee	Pearson Correlation	-0,049	1	-0,039	,799(**)	,567(**)	,909(**)	,784(**)	,622(**)	0,141	-,371(*)	0,200	0,091	0,189	0,040	0,117	.(a)	,886(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,759		0,806	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,378	0,017	0,210	0,571	0,238	0,803	0,465	.	0,000
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Sharing_hall	Pearson Correlation	-0,147	-0,039	1	-0,227	-0,236	0,133	0,194	-,444(**)	,360(*)	,764(**)	,658(**)	-0,229	-0,201	0,214	0,031	.(a)	-0,283

	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,358	0,806		0,153	0,138	0,406	0,225	0,004	0,021	0,000	0,000	0,150	0,207	0,179	0,848	.	0,073
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Highest price	Pearson Correlation	0,187	,799(**)	-0,227	1	,826(**)	,522(**)	,364(*)	,879(**)	0,268	-,507(**)	0,225	,309(*)	0,287	0,130	0,185	.(a)	,934(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,242	0,000	0,153		0,000	0,000	0,019	0,000	0,090	0,001	0,156	0,049	0,069	0,419	0,248	.	0,000
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Maximum box office revenues	Pearson Correlation	,687(**)	,567(**)	-0,236	,826(**)	1	0,285	-0,007	,937(**)	,612(**)	-0,301	,316(*)	,663(**)	,406(**)	,352(*)	0,246	.(a)	,848(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000	0,138	0,000		0,071	0,965	0,000	0,000	0,056	0,044	0,000	0,009	0,024	0,120	.	0,000
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Chairs taken for guarantee	Pearson Correlation	-0,203	,909(**)	0,133	,522(**)	0,285	1	,919(**)	,313(*)	0,070	-0,180	0,199	-0,083	0,057	-0,030	0,013	.(a)	,656(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,204	0,000	0,406	0,000	0,071		0,000	0,046	0,663	0,261	0,213	0,606	0,723	0,851	0,934	.	0,000
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41

% Chairs taken for guarantee	Pearson Correlation	-,496(**)	,784(**)	0,194	,364(*)	-0,007	,919(**)	1	0,079	-0,199	-0,192	0,064	-,315(*)	-0,064	-0,093	-0,020	.(a)	,454(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001	0,000	0,225	0,019	0,965	0,000		0,622	0,212	0,230	0,690	0,045	0,692	0,562	0,902	.	0,003
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Maximum_promoter	Pearson Correlation	,512(**)	,622(**)	-,444(**)	,879(**)	,937(**)	,313(*)	0,079	1	0,297	-,592(**)	0,021	,569(**)	,403(**)	0,228	0,204	.(a)	,914(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001	0,000	0,004	0,000	0,000	0,046	0,622		0,060	0,000	0,895	0,000	0,009	0,152	0,200	.	0,000
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Maximum hall	Pearson Correlation	,718(**)	0,141	,360(*)	0,268	,612(**)	0,070	-0,199	0,297	1	,520(**)	,817(**)	,524(**)	0,197	,446(**)	0,211	.(a)	0,249
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,378	0,021	0,090	0,000	0,663	0,212	0,060		0,000	0,000	0,000	0,218	0,003	0,186	.	0,117
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
maximum_proc_hall	Pearson Correlation	0,093	-,371(*)	,764(**)	-,507(**)	-0,301	-0,180	-0,192	-,592(**)	,520(**)	1	,693(**)	-0,086	-0,181	0,199	0,014	.(a)	-,543(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,562	0,017	0,000	0,001	0,056	0,261	0,230	0,000	0,000		0,000	0,593	0,257	0,211	0,931	.	0,000

	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
per_chair	Pearson Correlation	0,229	0,200	,658(**)	0,225	,316(*)	0,199	0,064	0,021	,817(**)	,693(**)	1	0,148	0,036	0,258	0,120	.(a)	0,116
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,150	0,210	0,000	0,156	0,044	0,213	0,690	0,895	0,000	0,000		0,356	0,822	0,103	0,453	.	0,469
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
occupation	Pearson Correlation	,769(**)	0,091	-0,229	,309(*)	,663(**)	-0,083	-,315(*)	,569(**)	,524(**)	-0,086	0,148	1	,843(**)	,475(**)	,366(*)	.(a)	,384(*)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,571	0,150	0,049	0,000	0,606	0,045	0,000	0,000	0,593	0,356		0,000	0,002	0,019	.	0,013
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Occupation_proc	Pearson Correlation	,332(*)	0,189	-0,201	0,287	,406(**)	0,057	-0,064	,403(**)	0,197	-0,181	0,036	,843(**)	1	0,290	,376(*)	.(a)	,336(*)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,034	0,238	0,207	0,069	0,009	0,723	0,692	0,009	0,218	0,257	0,822	0,000		0,066	0,016	.	0,032
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Average occupation	Pearson Correlation	,488(**)	0,040	0,214	0,130	,352(*)	-0,030	-0,093	0,228	,446(**)	0,199	0,258	,475(**)	0,290	1	,771(**)	.(a)	0,155

	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001	0,803	0,179	0,419	0,024	0,851	0,562	0,152	0,003	0,211	0,103	0,002	0,066		0,000	.	0,332
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
proc_occupation	Pearson Correlation	0,237	0,117	0,031	0,185	0,246	0,013	-0,020	0,204	0,211	0,014	0,120	,366(*)	,376(*)	,771(**)	1	.(a)	0,182
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,136	0,465	0,848	0,248	0,120	0,934	0,902	0,200	0,186	0,931	0,453	0,019	0,016	0,000		.	0,255
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Grant = no'	Pearson Correlation	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)		.(a)	.(a)	.(a)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		.		.
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
finverpl	Pearson Correlation	0,277	,886(**)	-0,283	,934(**)	,848(**)	,656(**)	,454(**)	,914(**)	0,249	-,543(**)	0,116	,384(*)	,336(*)	0,155	0,182	.(a)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,079	0,000	0,073	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,003	0,000	0,117	0,000	0,469	0,013	0,032	0,332	0,255	.	
	N	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41